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Graves: Penalty Clauses as Remedies

PENALTY CLAUSES AS REMEDIES:
EXPLORING COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO
ENFORCEABILITY
Jack Graves* **
Commercial agreements often provide for “fixed sums” payable upon a specified breach. The common law distinguishes between provisions for “liquidated damages” and “penalty” clauses,
enforcing the former, while invalidating the latter as punitive. In
contrast, such agreements are generally enforced in civil law jurisdictions, without any distinction between liquidated damages and
penalties—though they may be reduced if excessive, even as penalties. In contrast, this same split between the civil and common law
jurisdictions can be found in the treatment of specific relief, with the
former presumptively granting such “ordinary” relief, subject to a
narrowly cabined set of exceptions, and the latter granting such relief
only under certain limited “extraordinary” circumstances.
In a recent article, I suggested that the validity of “fixed
sums,” as “penalties,” was an issue not governed by the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(the “CISG”) and, instead, left to otherwise applicable domestic law.
In doing so, I pointed to the relationship under the civil law between
the ordinary right to specific performance and the general enforceability of penalties, in arguing that the treatment of one under the
CISG suggested a general principle informing the proper treatment
of the other under that same body of law. Interestingly, however, Israeli law takes a unique combined approach to these two remedies:
specific performances and fixed sums (or “agreed compensation” as
termed under Israeli law).1 Israeli law seemingly follows a civil law
*

Professor of Law, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, NY, USA.
Editor’s Note: The following article has been adapted with additional commentary and
concepts from Jack Graves, Penalty Clauses and the CISG, 30 J.L. & COM. 153, 153 (2012).
1
Yehuda Adar & Gabriela Shalev, The Law of Remedies in a Mixed Jurisdiction: The Israeli Experience, 23 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 111, 134 (2008).
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approach to specific performance, while following the common law
approach to agreed compensation in the form of fixed sums.2 This
paper examines the “mixed” nature of the Israeli approach to remedies and then asks if this examination might shed any further light on
the logic (or lack thereof) of the common law distinction between liquidated damages and penalties.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Contracts often provide for payment of “fixed sums” upon a
specified breach.3 Such terms may serve a broad variety of purposes.4 However, most such purposes will focus on one of three basic
objectives: (1) good faith estimation of damages likely to be caused
by the specified breach; (2) coercion of performance by requiring, in
the event of non-performance, the payment of a fixed sum that exceeds any reasonable estimate of actual damages; or (3) limitation of
damages by fixing a sum less than any reasonable estimate of actual
damages.5 This article will focus on the distinction between the first
two objectives—the estimation of actual damages, as contrasted with
coercion of performance through the threat of a penalty for nonperformance. In the discussion that follows, and consistent with
common practice,6 I will use the term “liquidated damages” clause to
refer to a “fixed sum” intended as a good faith estimate of actual
damages, while I will use the term “penalty clause” to refer to a punitive “fixed sum” intended to deter breach beyond the effect provided
by the standard monetary “expectation” remedy for breach.
Liquidated damages clauses in commercial agreements are
generally enforceable in all legal systems.7 In contrast, penalty
clauses are generally enforceable in civil law systems,8 but have his2

Id.
See, e.g., JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 125(A) (2001).
4
See, e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.18 (4th ed. 2004).
5
MURRAY JR., supra note 3.
6
See, e.g., MURRAY, JR., supra note 3, § 125(A)(1); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4 (discussing liquidated damages in terms of penalties and remedies).
7
INGEBORG SCHWENZER AND PASCAL HACHEM, SCHLECHTRIEM & SCHWENZER:
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) para.
44, at 93 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 3d ed. 2010); Pascal Hachem, Fixed Sums in CISG Contracts, 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 217, 220 (2009) [hereinafter Hachem, Fixed
Sums].
8
Hachem, Fixed Sums, supra note 7, at 220 (explaining that while a penalty clause may
be reduced, as “excessive” under most civil law regimes, such a reduction is very different
3
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torically been deemed invalid under the common law based on their
coercive nature and punitive effect when enforced.9 This same split
between the civil and common law jurisdictions can be found in the
treatment of specific relief, with the former presumptively granting
such relief, subject to a narrowly cabined set of exceptions, and the
latter granting such relief only under certain “extraordinary” circumstances.10 These two distinct doctrinal splits arguably focus on the
same basic philosophical difference between the common and civil
law approaches to the enforcement of a promise—the common law
generally seeks to give effect to the economic value of the promise
while the civil law generally seeks to give effect to the promise itself.
Interestingly, however, Israeli law takes a unique combined approach
to these two remedies: specific performances and fixed sums (or
“agreed compensation” as termed under Israeli law)—seemingly following a civil law approach to the former and a common law approach to the latter.11
This article begins with a very brief comparison of the manner
in which common and civil law systems treat penalty clauses and the
remedy of specific performance.12 It then examines the apparently
“mixed” nature of the Israeli approach in addressing these two remedies and asks if this difference in approach might shed any further
light on the logic (or lack thereof) of the common law distinction between liquidated damages and penalties.13
II.

COMPARATIVE LEGAL TREATMENT OF PENALTY CLAUSES
AND THE REMEDY OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

The treatment of penalty clauses is fundamentally different, as
between civil and common law legal systems. A penalty clause is
generally enforceable under the civil law, while it is not enforceable
under the common law.14 Moreover, the same theoretical underpin-

from the common law approach to invalidating penalty clauses, which abhors any penalty).
9
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4 (explaining the common law as limiting fixed sums to those
that are “compensatory” in nature—in contrast, by implication, to those that are “punitive” in
nature).
10
Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the International Sale of Goods?
Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314, 337 (2005).
11
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1.
12
See discussion infra Part II.
13
See discussion infra Part III.
14
See discussion infra Part II-A.
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nings of these different approaches to penalty clauses can also be
found in the two legal systems’ different approaches to the remedy of
specific performance.15
A.

Penalty Clauses

The civil law generally enforces fixed sums, whether intended
to approximate damages or to deter breach.16 Thus, a fixed sum intended as a “penalty” will typically be enforced. While a court may
adjust the amount of a “penalty” it considers excessive, the fact that
the “penalty” tends to deter breach does not, itself, preclude enforcement.17 The prominent issue is the amount of the penalty and whether that amount is deemed excessive.18
Like civil law, the common law also grants contracting parties
substantial autonomy in defining their respective rights and obligations.19 However, their autonomy in defining remedies for breach is
subject to certain limits, including limits on “fixed sums” payable in
the event of breach.20 A sum fixing an amount or method of determining “liquidated damages” is enforceable, while a sum fixing a
“penalty” intended to deter breach is void.21
In view of the fact that most civil law regimes provide some
limits on the amount of a penalty clause, one might be tempted to
suggest a similarity between the civil and common law approach in
that each in some fashion restricts the parties’ autonomy with respect
to a contractually agreed upon fixed sum. However, the two systems
take fundamentally different approaches to justifying such restrictions, thus exposing the difference in their basic underlying prin-

15

See discussion infra Part II-B.
Pascal Hachem, Agreed Sums in CISG Contracts, 3 BELGRADE L. REV. 140, 141 (2011)
[hereinafter Hachem, Agreed Sums].
17
See id. at 141-42, 145-46 (discussing the history of civil law’s broad acceptance of
fixed sums).
18
Id. at 142.
19
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-301 (McKinney 1962) (defining the general obligation of buyers
and sellers as simply to comport with the terms of the contract). This article does not purport
to provide a complete survey of common law legal regimes or any nuanced differences
among them in the treatment of “fixed sums.” Instead, United States common law, as well
as its reflection in UCC Article 2, is used here as exemplary of the common law approach to
the issue.
20
See, e.g., UCC §2-718(2)(3) (2011) (providing statutory limits on the parties’ contractual rights to limit or exclude certain remedies).
21
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4.
16
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ciples.22 Unlike the civil law, the common law abhors any penalty—
irrespective of the amount.23
The parties to a contract may stipulate in advance to a specified amount or methodology for determining damages in the event of
a specified breach. As long as the amount represents a reasonable effort to ascertain in advance or “liquidate” damages that might otherwise be uncertain or difficult to prove, the provision will be enforceable as “liquidated damages.”24 Such clauses offer substantial utility
in providing a remedy in the event of breach while retaining the basic
common law focus on “compensatory” rather than “punitive” damages for breach of contract.25 In contrast, a “penalty” clause requires
payment of fixed amount that is inconsistent with this same basic approach.
A “penalty” clause goes beyond compensating the aggrieved
party for its promissory loss and has the further effect of deterring
breach and compelling performance.26 This is known as the “in
terrorem” effect of a penalty clause and is, in fact, the intent of such a
clause.27 This deterrent effect is inconsistent with the fundamental
remedial approach of the common law focus on redressing breach
through damages—but not compelling performance.28 Moreover, it
would be unjust to “punish” a party based on what is essentially a
“strict liability” standard for breach of contract.29 Common law damages are intended to be, in effect, neutral as between performance and
payment of damages for non-performance.30 This common law hos22

Id.
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
FARNSWORTH, supra note 4.
27
Id.
28
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 149 (8th ed. 2011).
29
XCO Int’l, Inc. v. Pacific Scientific Co., 369 F.3d 998, 1001-02 (7th Cir. 2004); Charles
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation
Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 554, 560-61 (1977).
30
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 558 (explaining the indifference between performance and payment of damages is often referred to as the “indifference principle”); see also
Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 16, at 221. Hachem suggests that the value of a party’s
right to specific performance must be accounted for in applying this principle, thereby justifying the use of a penalty intended to deter breach. However, this mixes the civil law right
to such performance with a common law principle based on the damages as the normal remedy. The civil law right to performance and the right to enforce a penalty clause go hand-inglove—just as the common law preference for damages and the invalidity of a penalty
23
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tility towards penalty clauses originated in courts of equity, which by
the end of the seventeenth century were no longer willing to enforce
the historical “penal bond,”31 sending the parties instead to courts of
law for a determination of actual monetary damages.32 Today, the
common law renders a penalty clause generally unenforceable, and,
in the case of United States law governing the sale of goods, deems
such a penalty “void.”33
Notably, the parties to a contract may accomplish some of the
same objectives as those they might seek to accomplish through a
penalty clause by framing the fixed sum due as a contractual performance obligation instead of a remedy for breach. For example, a bonus that gives significant incentives for performance would likely be
fully enforceable, whereas a penalty for non-performance would not.
A fixed sum may also fairly be characterized as one of two “alternative performances,” in which case the promised contractual obligation to pay the amount due is likely to be enforced.34
One might be tempted to point to these examples in suggesting that the common law treatment of fixed sums is more about form
than substance. However, there is a critical difference between the
above contractual promise to pay money as a performance obligation
and a “penalty” clause triggered by a breach. The former involves
the parties’ rights and obligations, while the latter involves a remedy
for breach sought from a court or arbitral tribunal after the parties’
agreement has run aground on the rocks of an intractable dispute.
When parties negotiate a contract, they typically focus far more on
their performance “rights and obligations” than on “remedies” in the
event of breach. Parties expect to perform—not to breach—so their
exercise of autonomy with respect to the former arguably deserves
greater deference than the latter.
The common law approach to penalties has unquestionably

clause.
31
See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE (Barbara A. Mowat
& Paul Werstine eds., Wash. Square Press 1992) (illustrating possibly the most famous “penal bond” was that of Antonio’s promise of a “pound of flesh” to Shylock in the event of default on his promise to repay 300 Ducats); see also 1 STEWART MACAULEY, ET AL.,
CONTRACTS: LAW IN ACTION, THE INTRODUCTORY COURSE 107 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the
“pound of flesh” and The Merchant of Venice in connection with penalty clauses).
32
MURRAY, JR., supra note 3, § 125(A)(1); FARNSWORTH, supra note 4.
33
U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (2011).
34
See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.34 (6th ed. 2009).
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been subject to substantial criticism by both courts35 and commentators.36 However, its continued application by the courts—in spite of
such criticism—also proves its continuing vitality as domestic United
States law.37 The most common modern justification for the rule is
based on the theory of “efficient breach.” In effect, society as a
whole may be better served by a breach. If so, as long as the aggrieved party receives monetary damages compensating for its expectation loss, breach will be more efficient than performance.38
Critics argue that the “efficient breach” theory is flawed, both
as a matter of business reality and economic theory. Contrary to the
traditional theory of “efficient breach,” a penalty clause deterring
breach may actually be more efficient, because this will simply lead
the parties to negotiate and share the economic fruits of the contemplated breach.39 However, this ignores the very real challenges inherent in negotiating in the context of what is essentially a bilateral
monopoly,40 as well as the potential economic interests of third parties in an efficient breach.
Critics of the common law approach also often argue in favor
of the “utility” of penalty clauses by pointing to various forms of
damages that are difficult to calculate or prove.41 However, these arguments fail to recognize that a true “liquidated damages” provision
addresses the same issue and is fully enforceable, as such. One of the
primary purposes of a “liquidated damages” clause is to provide for
damages that are difficult to calculate or prove. In contrast, a true
“penalty” clause is intended to deter a breach, rather than remedy
such a breach.
The above analysis is exemplary only and is not intended to
be exhaustive or to suggest that the common law approach is neces35
XCO Int’l, Inc., 369 F.3d at 1001-02; Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d
1284, 1288-89 (7th Cir. 1985).
36
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 29; Kenneth W. Clarkson, et al., Liquidated Damages v.
Penalties: Sense or Nonsense, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 351 (1978).
37
See, e.g., XCO Int’l, Inc., 369 F.3d at 1002-03; Lake River Corp., 769 F.2d at 1289
(noting the departures from this standard approach in certain areas, such as insurance law);
Hachem, Agreed Sums, supra note 16, at 147 (explaining that these departures are sui generis and typically involve what is, essentially, a tort, such as bad faith breach of an insurance
contract).
38
XCO Int’l, Inc., 369 F.3d at 1001; see POSNER, supra note 28 (for a more thorough
analysis of the theory of an “efficient breach”).
39
See Goetz & Scott, supra note 29, at 567-68.
40
POSNER, supra note 28, at 78.
41
Id. at 160.
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sarily superior to that of the civil law. In fact, there is much to commend each. The two key points, for purposes of this article, are that:
(1) the common law will not enforce a “penalty” clause, as such, and
that the reasons underlying this approach are reasonably defensible
and not wholly irrational; and (2) the civil law will, in contrast, enforce a “penalty clause.”
B.

The Remedy of Specific Performance

The difference between the civil and common law treatment
of penalty clauses is mirrored in the treatment of performance-based
remedies in the two legal systems. The civil law treats specific performance as the ordinary remedy for breach, while the common law
treats specific performance as an extraordinary remedy. 42 The ordinary civil law remedy focuses on the actual promises of the parties.
Subject only to a narrow set of exceptions, a party to a contract governed by civil law will have an ordinary right to specific enforcement
of its contracting partner’s actual promises.43 In contrast, a party to a
contract governed by the common law will ordinarily be entitled only
to a “substitutional” remedy of money damages, absent a showing of
extraordinary circumstances justifying specific relief.44
The common law approach to specific performance is based
on the same basic doctrinal underpinnings as its approach to penalty
clauses—the ordinary common law of remedies is neutral, as between
performance and payment of damages in compensation for nonperformance.45 As in the case of penalty clauses, the common law’s
treatment of performance-based remedies reflects a general “economic” approach to remedies.46 In contrast, the civil law focuses on the
“promissory” nature of a contract—whether enforcing a promise to
pay a fixed sum in the event of a defined breach (even if it amounts
to a “penalty”) or any other contractual promise.47
If a party refuses to perform a contractual promise, a civil law
42

See Ferrari, supra note 10, at 336-37.
MURRAY, JR., supra note 3, § 127(A).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See XCO Int’l, Inc., 369 F.3d at 1001 (explaining that the doctrine of efficient breach
drives not only the common law approach to penalties, but also the common law treatment of
damages, as the normal remedy, and specific relief, as extraordinary).
47
See MURRAY, JR., supra note 3, § 127 (noting the civil law’s inclination to compel the
contract promise be fulfilled).
43
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court will typically compel such performance.48 Thus, it seems entirely consistent to allow one of the parties to “compel” the other’s
performance through the use of a “penalty” clause. In contrast, a
common law court will not typically compel a party’s actual performance, so it would seem inconsistent to give either of the parties such
a right.49 Admittedly, a common law court may, under proper circumstances, order specific performance, as an extraordinary remedy.50 However, a discretionary and extraordinary award of specific
performance by a court of equity is far different from the grant of
power to one of the parties to compel performance through a penalty
clause.
In summary, we can see that the treatment of “penalty” clauses and the remedy of specific performance each rely on a single set of
core principles, and the differences between their “linked” or related
treatment in civil and common law systems arise from differing core
contract principles in each of these systems. Each of these relationships was expressly recognized in Secretariat Commentary to the
CISG.51 Thus, we would typically expect any given legal system to
(1) enforce “penalty” clauses and treat “performance” as the ordinary
remedy for breach; or (2) refuse to enforce “penalty” clauses and
treat “performance” as an extraordinary remedy—but not to mix the
two.52 This leads us to an examination of Israeli contract law, which
does exactly the latter.
III.

ISRAELI LAW AS A “MIXED” APPROACH TO REMEDIES

Israel’s legal system reflects a “mix” of common and civil law
principles.53 However, one might reasonably expect Israeli law to
48

Id.
See id. (stating that “money damages is the normal common law remedy”).
50
Id.
51
See GLOBAL SALES LAW, http://www.globalsaleslaw.org/index.cfm?pageID=644#Article%2046
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013) (recognizing the Secretariat Commentary to the CISG in art. 46,
paras. 9-10).
52
See Ferrari, supra note 10, at 337 (recognizing that the decision whether or not to enforce “penalty” clauses, especially in solving disputes governed by the CISG, specifically
Article 28, would depend on the law in the court’s jurisdiction because, according to the
CISG, if “one party is entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a
court is not bound to enter a judgement [sic] for specific performance unless the court would
do so under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting CISG, art. 28).
53
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1; Gabriela Shalev, Law of Contract, in ISRAELI BUSINESS
LAW: AN ESSENTIAL GUIDE 25, 25-26 (Alon Kaplan ed., 1996) [hereinafter Shalev, Law of
49
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follow either a common or civil law approach to both penalty clauses
and the remedy of specific performance, in view of the similar principles that drive both. In this article, I note that Israeli law in fact
takes differing approaches to these two issues,54 and then suggest that
these two differing approaches may be reasonably reconciled and that
this reconciliation may shed additional light on the common law’s
traditional disdain for penalties.55 Having suggested a consistent rationale for this “mixed” approach to the two remedies at issue, I then
illustrate the point by reference to Shakespeare’s The Merchant of
Venice.56
A.

Israeli Law

When one party breaches a contract obligation, the aggrieved
party will ordinarily be entitled to require actual performance of the
contract.57 This right to performance is limited only by four specific
statutory exceptions in cases of: (1) impossibility of performance; (2)
personal work or service; (3) a requirement of excessive supervision
of performance; or (4) circumstances in which a requirement of performance would be unjust. The ordinary remedial presumption is,
therefore, one in which a court will require actual performance at the
request of an aggrieved contracting party. This approach to the basic
remedy of performance is fully consistent with civil law doctrine.58
Unlike the common law, the civil law does not typically draw
a distinction between contract rights and remedies for breach of contract.59 Instead, a civil law “remedy” is simply another contract right
or entitlement.60 Under this view, the court merely enforces the parties’ basic entitlements, instead of seeking to remedy a breach or
“right a wrong” of some sort.61 Importantly, however, the court reContract].
54
See discussion infra Part III–1; see Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 111 (noting the
same mixed approach to the two remedies).
55
See discussion infra Part III-B.
56
See discussion infra Part III-C.
57
Contracts (Remedies for Breach of Contract) Law, 5731—1970 Dated 27th March
1971, in 1 LOUIS GARB, BUSINESS LAWS OF ISRAEL1.5-1, 1.5-1-1.5-3(Louis Garb, et al., eds.,
2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter GARB]; see also Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 140; Shalev, Law
of Contract, supra note 53, at 35.
58
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 134; Shalev, Law of Contract, supra note 53, at 35.
59
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 113.
60
Id. at 114.
61
Id. at 122.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss3/11

10

Graves: Penalty Clauses as Remedies

2013]

PENALTY CLAUSES AS REMEDIES

691

tains a limited review function based on the four enunciated statutory
exceptions.62
In view of its granting to the parties of an “ordinary” right to a
remedy of “performance,” one might reasonably expect Israeli law
similarly to enforce the parties’ attempt to ensure performance
through the use of a penalty clause. However, Israeli law takes a different path, following the general common law approach in eschewing “penalties.”63
When an aggrieved party seeks monetary damages, Israeli law
applies a “compensatory” approach much like that of the common
law.64 The aggrieved party is entitled to “compensation for the damage caused to him by the breach and its consequences and which the
person in breach foresaw or should have foreseen, at the time the
contract was made, as a probable consequence of the breach.”65 Such
“compensation” may be agreed upon in advance (“agreed compensation”), in which case the aggrieved party shall be entitled to such
amount, without proof of actual damages. A court may, however,
“reduce the compensation if it finds that it was fixed without any reasonable relation to the damage which could be foreseen, at the time
the contract was made, as a probable consequence of the breach.”66
Thus, a court will not enforce “agreed compensation” if it is
not reasonably related to the actual amount of damages, as such damages would be calculated under the statute.67 In other words, a court
will enforce an amount reasonably intended to “liquidate” damages in
advance, but will not enforce an amount that is intended as a “penalty.”68 This approach to “agreed compensation,” generally, and penalties, specifically, is fully consistent with common law doctrine.69
So, is this “mixed” civil and common law approach to these
two issues inconsistent, or can such a “mix” be reasonably reconciled? The most obvious distinction between “performance,” as a
62

See discussion infra Part III-B.
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 133-34.
64
Id.
65
GARB, supra note 57, para. 10, at 1.5-3.
66
Id. para. 15(a), at 1.5-4. Again, it is important to distinguish between a rule providing
for a reduction in a fixed sum that is excessive, as damages (the Israeli approach), and a rule
providing for a reduction in a fixed sum that is excessive, even as a penalty (the civil law
approach).
67
See PERILLO, supra note 34, §14.31.
68
Id. §14.31(c); GARB, supra note 57.
69
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 133-34.
63
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remedy, and the use of a penalty to require that same performance is
the unique and important role of the court in the former. However,
there is arguably another crucial difference in the manner in which
the parties view expected performance obligations, as distinguished
from remedies for unanticipated breaches.
B.

A Distinction with a Difference

Modern contract law grants sophisticated parties almost unlimited autonomy in crafting their basic rights and obligations under a
contract.70 However, the law is far more restrictive when it comes to
remedies, and there is a sound and obvious basis for the distinction.
The parties’ voluntary performance of their respective contractual obligations does not typically require the overt coercion of the state. In
contrast, remedies do ultimately rely on the enforcement power of the
state, and this power is often limited. The Israeli law governing specific performance is a perfect illustration of such limits.
While an aggrieved party is “ordinarily” entitled to “performance,” the court may limit that right under the Israeli statute when
the circumstances suggest that requiring performance is fundamentally unreasonable or unjust.71 However, a party faced with a contract
provision mandating the payment of a “penalty” for non-performance
must perform or pay the penalty—assuming it is to be enforced.72
The party’s dilemma of “performance or penalty” will not necessarily
be mitigated in the same way a court will exercise its judgment in deciding whether or not to award a remedy of performance. Thus, the
Israeli statute regarding “agreed sums” can reasonably be explained
as limiting the parties to agreement on truly compensatory amounts
and reserving to the state the power to “compel” performance.
However, there is another, somewhat more subtle, distinction
that may also serve to justify the common law approach to penalties—even in a system in which performance is the “ordinary” remedy for breach. While most parties give significant consideration to
their contractual promises before undertaking those promises, far less
consideration is typically given to remedies to be invoked only in the
event of breach. At the time of contract, few parties—even sophisti70
See Michael Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through
the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 36-41 (1996).
71
See infra Part III-A.
72
Adar & Shalev, supra note 1, at 133.
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cated parties—ever believe they will breach.
C. The Merchant of Venice Revisited
An excellent illustration of the above-described phenomenon
can be found in Act 1, Scene III, of Shakespeare’s The Merchant of
Venice.73 The scene opens with Shylock, a sophisticated lender, negotiating a loan with Antonio, a sophisticated merchant. 74 When
Shylock proposes a “pound of flesh,” as a bond in the event of Antonio’s default (a classic “penalty” clause), Bassanio (the ultimate beneficiary of the loan) immediately protests “you shall not seal such a
bond for me . . . .”75 However, Antonio is undeterred by the onerous
penalty, explaining:
Why, fear not, man, I will not forfeit it!
Within these two months—that’s a month before
This bond expires—I do expect return
Of thrice three times the value of this bond.76
It is simply beyond Antonio’s contemplation that he will default, so the punitive bond is ignored.77 When Antonio seals the
bond, he does so in the firm and unwavering certainty that it will
never come due. Of course, the unthinkable transpires—all of Antonio’s ships are lost, and he fails to repay the loan when due.78 Did
Antonio actually consent to give Shylock a pound of flesh, or did Antonio simply assume that provision out of the contemplated bargain?
I would suggest that the latter is far more reflective of Antonio’s conscious intent.I am not suggesting that contract law should abandon
generally accepted rules of interpretation focusing on objective manifestations of intent when parties, in good faith, disagree over the content of their agreement. However, I would suggest that, in the vast
majority of contracts, neither party expects to breach its obligations.
Thus, when thinking about enforcing the parties’ actual bargain-infact, it is quite objectively reasonable to distinguish between affirmative promises of performance and advance agreements regarding
remedies for breach.
73
74
75
76
77
78

SHAKESPEARE, supra note 38, at act I, sc. III.
Id. at 31.
Id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 39.
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 38, at 99-103.
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CONCLUSION

All legal systems will enforce contractual rights and obligations to which parties effectively consent, even if the parties fail to
read the documents in which they are found. All legal systems will
also enforce a genuine estimate of damages in the event of breach—
even if the contracting parties did not expect such a breach—because
a genuine estimate of expectation damages serves as a functional
equivalent of the promised performance. However, a penalty is arguably far beyond the parties’ actual expectations at the time of contracting. As such, a reasonable case can be made that this distinction
justifies the common law difference in treatment between “liquidated
damages” clauses and “penalty” clauses, as remedies.
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